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Abstract 
 
Rodriguez (2002, p4) argues that no narrative is meant to be kept to oneself, it is for sharing with 
others and with this sharing comes a social infrastructure that bonds and binds each of us to 
others in a inimitable way, and furthermore, a concept which allows individuals to critically 
examine the repercussions and outcomes of their actions. If it is accepted that narratives are a 
means for the individual to address and share these issues, what are the underlying processes that 
may effect the reflection of these issues to form a narrative. 
It is the intention here to question what may be one of the underpinning requirements of an 
individual to work within a narrative framework, the concept of self awareness, and in particular 
the ability to communicate this awareness to others. 
Carson (2001, p199) states that ‘all situations can be described in a number of ways which reflect 
not just an author’s values, but also, more crucially, an authors’ identity’. This paper will 
question whether there is a singular unified ‘self’, or as James (1892) maintains, the individual is 
a highly complex social entity and that we display ‘as many different selves as people we interact 
with’ 
The concept of self awareness will be explored through relevant historical and contemporary 
literature in order to attempt to discover who in essence is writing the stories recounted in a 
narrative. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What exactly are narratives? There are numerous theoretical, historical, and contemporary 
definitions about what constitutes a narrative across a diversity of disciplines. Although I 
appreciate these ideas express the usefulness of narratives in many different settings, I still had a 
difficulty in grasping the concept of the use of narratives as a valid methodology for my own 
work. Why, for instance employ a narrative methodology to explore an individual’s experiences 
instead of asking them to compile a personal journal, or utilise an interview format and then 
scrutinise the information gleaned from the resulting transcripts. To me a narrative seemed to be 
a skewed way to look at an individual’s experiences because the narrative is predominantly a 
product of the writer’s individuality, and therefore constrained or distorted by this individualism 
within the zeitgeist. If it is conceded that as individuals develop and change over time, and they 
are also altered by their life experiences, surely the ‘act’ of creating a narrative will be a part of 
this change process and therefore make the narrative obsolete by the time it is completed, in 
effect as useful as yesterdays newspaper. This raises the question of who then actually writes the 
narrative and to what extent and importance does the notion of self awareness impact on the 
resulting narrative. This article attempts to explain my journey into exploring what narratives 
mean to me, and how they may be used to further my own research. 
 
 
Self awareness 
 Self awareness is a concept that has been debated across both the centuries and across 
disciplines. It is inextricably linked with the notion of the self concept, self esteem and self 
image. Although it is difficult to isolate these closely related areas, I do not want to concentrate 
here on the processes and developmental theories of self per se, but to contemplate in more detail 
on how we actually perceive ourselves as an individual and how these perceptions may impact 
upon our personal interpretation over time, recall of events or experiences, and how we 
ultimately communicate our experiences through the medium of narratives. According to 
Hergenhahn (1997, p18) the perception of self stays relatively stable over time even though we 
may dramatically physically change. This view however, is not universally accepted. Hampson 
(1995, p30) argues that the idea of a unified concept of self may be too simplistic an approach 
and is not substantiated. In effect we become a social chameleon, we have the ability to adapt to 
each social situation or social interaction and we exhibit a different/alternative/modified version 
of ourselves to meet the demands of that situation/interaction. 
 
These roles it could be argued are social constructs (Hampson 1995, p32) and that the basis of 
these social constructs have their origins in language. Language could be considered to be a 
major constraining factor which not only limits the manner in which we perceive others; it also 
determines how we perceive ourselves. Rodriguez (2002, p4) argues as we are ‘languaged’ 
beings, ‘the nature of our language is the nature of our world’. Furthermore can narratives be 
considered to be complete or ‘perfect’ if language itself is neither perfect nor complete? 
 
Historically the self has been seen as a separate entity and referred to in several different ways, 
as the soul, as the mind or the more contemporary view of some that the self is the ‘organiser of 
experience’ (Hergenhahn 1997, p18). Tauber (2005, p49) argues that in the 17th century the rise 
in interest in self awareness was due in part to the desire to thwart the rise in skepticism by 
idealizing the ‘knowing self’. James (1892, p35) however is credited as being the first to question 
the concept of the self and to distinguish between the complexities of a multi faceted self and the 
notion of a singular self. 
 
James made the differentiation between ‘I’ as the knower, and ’me’ as the known. The ‘me’ 
James further believed was an integral part of the self which consisted of a material self (our 
possessions), the social self (as seen by others) and the spiritual self (a state of consciousness). 
This concept was embraced in later years by post Kantian philosophers (Hegel, Emerson and 
Kierkegaard) who furthered the notions of self consciousness. From a structuralism point of 
view, however, (as Hergenhahn cites it) self awareness or introspection is not a true 
representation of an event or experience, but an interpretation of it based on the memory of that 
event, furthermore by revisiting the event it would be inevitably changed by this re-visitation 
(p247). 
If the concept put forward by James is accepted, that we are as many selves as people we meet or 
situations we encounter, how can a narrative can be a valid representation of a person’s 
experience for more than a fleeting speck of time, as soon as the experience is thought about, 
time will distort the experience based on new experiences. Therefore it could be argued that a 
narrative cannot accurately reflect experience and be a true representation of the self. Can this 
though only be a small indication of what narrative methodology can offer, what if narratives are 
more than a mirror to gain insight into beliefs and behaviours surrounding an event, are they 
possibly a far more complicated process than this? If looked at in a broader sense can narratives 
be considered to be a method in which this reflective process allows a moment of ‘clarity’ in 
which an individual can gain an insight into the enduring self? 
 
At a family funeral recently I was speaking to my cousin and asking after the health of my aunty 
Betty. Aunty Betty is in her mid eighties and after having a couple of major strokes several years 
ago resides in a care home and requires 24 hour medical support. My cousin told me of a recent 
visit to the home in which she had a strange conversation with one of my aunties carers. It 
appears that one of the things the carers do to keep the client’s mentally active is ask them who 
they are. The carer told my cousin that one morning when asked who my aunty Betty was she 
replied ‘Elizabeth Sneddon’. 
No said the carer you are Betty Wynn, ‘no I’m not I’m Elizabeth Sneddon’ came the reply. After 
this went on for a few minutes the carer dropped the subject as aunty Betty was getting quite 
upset and frustrated, but adamant she was Elizabeth Sneddon. My cousin thought for a moment 
and told the carer that yes in fact Aunty Betty and Elizabeth Sneddon were one and the same, as 
although for the last 70 years she was known as Betty Wynn, Elizabeth Sneddon was the name 
she was known as when child in Scotland. As a researcher, this event raised several questions 
about my auntie’s behaviour, and one paramount to my area of study the concept of self 
awareness. Why had after a period of over 70 years had my aunty suddenly, and vehemently 
reverted to her childhood identity? 
 
Can such a strong sense of identity be enduring throughout a lifetime? Brown (2000, p5) in a 
similar vein proposes that trauma and the connection between this trauma and memory in older 
people is of immense importance of how an event is remembered, could the trauma in this case 
be the leaving from Scotland at an early age to settle in Wales? Brown further argues that the 
affect of traumatic events alters how the individual stores and retrieves the memories associated 
with the trauma, maybe associated with age. 
 
Without getting embroiled in the lifespan development of self awareness debates (see Bee 1989, 
p134), there is abundant research into the continued development of self awareness in adults. 
Gardner (2001, p27) in particular looked at the development of self awareness in social work 
students and found that the increased capacity and skill for self awareness in these students 
resulted in greater learning experience especially when a reflexive learning element was 
introduced. How though is this skill learned? Schneider (2002, p807) would argue that 
paramount to the learning of these reflexive skills is the relationship between self talk, self 
consciousness and self knowledge. 
Dunning (2006, p600) argues that although individuals may be able to develop a highly tuned 
concept of self awareness, this self awareness is susceptible to a high degree of bias which can 
lead to an exaggerated overestimation of their own characteristics or personality. For example 
individuals may overestimate how kind they are to others, how good a leader they are and how 
charitable to others they are. Dunning points out that even though we tend to overestimate our 
own self characteristics, perversely we are excellent (accurate) judges of our peers and other 
people’s characteristics (p601). 
Does the reason for this over- confidence have its origin in our cultural norms and the need to be 
seen as a successful person to be deemed socially acceptable (see Taylor and Brown 1998, p200) 
or are there other factors to be considered. If it is accepted that we overestimate our abilities do 
sociological factors influence or pressurize individuals to distort reality to see themselves as a 
‘better’ person? Egan (2002, p179) argues that individuals may be well aware of these 
distortions attributed to their personalities but purposely develop ‘blind spots’ about them. 
 These blind spots however might be something that we may or may not be consciously aware of.  
Carson (2001, p201) expresses surprise at how long students can maintain feelings of upset and 
anger (some ten or twenty years) but Individuals may through the process of self deception, 
decide not to confront certain issues in their lives because they are too painful or difficult to face, 
and they will in some cases utilize self defence mechanisms to manipulate their experiences by 
ignoring them or distorting them so they appear to be less intimidating and in a form that is more 
acceptable to them. 
 
For Goleman (1998, p47) however, the use of these maladaptive defense mechanisms should not 
be a constraining factor in the search for self awareness, instead self awareness should be a part 
of, and enhance, the individual’s ability to be free to experience their true feelings and our 
reflections on these feelings. To be self aware Goleman believes individuals have to have ‘some 
sophistication about their emotional lives’ (p48). Where does this emotional sophistication come 
from however? 
Goleman (1998, p54) maintains that the source of self awareness may have a neurological basis. 
Some individuals he argues may be more naturally attuned to introspection and self awareness 
and also be more effective at communicating their feelings and experiences. This communication 
of feelings may manifest itself in many ways, for example through music, through artistic works 
and through the creation of narratives. Astor (2005, p415) furthers this notion by claiming that 
novelists tend to take a problem from their own life and use the plot of the novel to address their 
own issues. 
If as Goleman proposes certain individuals are more in tune to their feelings and more self aware 
than others, this poses the question, is this just a neurological function without any sociological 
input. 
 
Although as previously mentioned, Schneider (2002, p807) claims that paramount to learning 
reflexive skills is the relationship between self talk, self consciousness and self knowledge, there 
is a view that suggests that to effectively know your own mind, it is imperative that the 
individual is able to understand the mind of others. Hobson et al (2006, p1) looked at the 
foundations of self awareness in relation to autism. In studies with autistic children it was found 
that the participants were limited in social and emotional self awareness. Hobson et al concluded 
that for children to develop a meaningful depth of self awareness they need also to identify with 
other people. This work reflects other mainstream studies by Robbins (2004, p129) who suggests 
that in order to fully understand ourselves we must first have the ability to understand how others 
think. Although this principle of empathy underpins humanistic psychology and counselling 
(predominantly Carl Rogers), it has over the years attracted considerable criticism (see Masson 
1993, p229). 
 
What constitutes a good narrative? If verbally communicated does it have to be articulate, if it is 
written does it have to be structured and grammatically correct or are these incidental to the 
individual and the story? According to Nelson (1989, p23) narratives are an integral part of how 
we learn about our world as children, and Mateas and Sengers (1998, p1) believe we continue 
this learning process into adulthood. There has been an increase in the study of narratives from 
different perspectives in recent years, in particular the growing body of research into gender and 
narratives. Bohanek et al (2004, p51) have enriched this gender based research by exploring the 
way in which the memory of emotional events differed by both valence and intensity in women. 
It was found that negative narratives contained more negative words, whilst positive narratives 
contained more positive words; furthermore negative narratives were longer whilst positive 
narratives were more coherent, (see also studies by Ludvig (2006, p245) on gender and 
narratives, and Haines and Kray’s (2005, p643) study on women’s self identification and social 
power). 
 
 
 
Narratives as a research methodology 
 
The question arises of does the use a narrative require a level of empathic understanding to be 
displayed in order to see the other person’s point of view? If we look at empathy from a 
Rogerian perspective it could be argued not. Are the goals of narratives and empathic research 
poles apart or do they have more in common than may be initially thought. Karinol (199, p147) 
claims that if the transformation rule approach to empathy is employed, it is an excellent 
heuristic method to make predictions about other’s thoughts and feelings. Carson (2001, p201) 
would argue though narratives does not require the student to ‘be’ the other person, but instead to 
imagine it. So it may be that although empathy and narratives hold a common general view on 
researching individual differences and their experiences, there are fundamental differences in the 
methodologies of these two approaches. Schiff (2006, p19) however, argues that the use of 
narratives in psychology shows great potential and could play a prominent role into examining 
the meanings individuals attribute to their experiences, (see also Boudens (2005, p1285) on the 
use of narrative analysis on workplace emotions). 
 
Can the use of narratives and in particular their use in my own research be influenced by Geertz 
(1993) and the ‘thick description’ methodology, or by Ellis and Bochner (2000) and an 
autoethnographical approach, or as a psychologist am I looking for a more eclectic approach 
integrating some positivistic approaches as well. As yet I am undecided. Can however, these two 
factions be effectively used in conjunction. As Bond (2002, p137) points out ‘natural science’ 
and narratives have little in common. In natural science the researcher remains outside the 
phenomenon as observer, be totally objective, generalizes findings and aims to show reliability 
and validity in their studies. In narratives the researcher is at the heart of the study, subjective, 
allows the reader to make their own judgments and examines the trustworthiness of the research. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
If as James (1892) and Hampson (1995, p32) proposes, we accept that as individuals we are not 
one self but comprise as many selves as situations we encounter, are written versions of events as 
numerous as our ‘many selves’. (To take this concept to an extreme, as this article has been 
compiled over several weeks, how many versions of my self have contributed to it as my 
experiences have changed? Does it really matter though, as Rodriguez (2002, p3) points out ‘no 
interpretation or meaning is ever complete. There is always a new and different interpretation’. 
 
I have utilized several conceptual or experiential approaches to critique the use of narratives as a 
research tool, looking at the issues surrounding the processes associated with self awareness (or 
multiple selves) and the impact emotions have on the intensity of these reported emotions when 
retold at a later date and the use by individuals of defence mechanisms and ‘blind spots’ to keep 
themselves safe. I am not suggesting the use of narratives is just another paradigm that is a 
product of the Zeitgeist but that it does have its merits. One key area where I see narratives being 
of immense importance is how it attempts to humanize science and place paramount the 
individual, their unique life experiences and the way in which they make sense of these feelings 
and experiences. Rodriguez (2002, p4) argues that no narrative is meant to be kept to oneself, it 
is for sharing with others and with this sharing comes a social infrastructure that bonds and binds 
each of us to others in a inimitable way, and furthermore, a concept which allows individuals to 
critically examine the repercussions and outcomes of their actions. Because of, or in spite of 
these arguments surrounding the use of narratives as a methodology, it was only after sitting in 
the back garden of my house lying back on the lawn staring into the sky I realised how and why 
narratives may be beneficial to my work. 
 
Watching the aeroplanes floating across a pure blue, cloud free sky I thought how busy it was up 
there today. I chastened myself almost immediately by noting it was probably always that busy 
up there amongst the numerous flight paths but because of cloud, rain or fog the planes were 
invisible to the eye. This made me think of our enduring self, is it part of us all but as we grow 
from childhood into adulthood it is suppressed by socialisation and societal norms? Can as we 
grow older like my aunty Betty, discard some of these socialised layers and get a glimpse of who 
we really are. It is a little unrealistic to think that to gain in insight into our enduring self we have 
to wait until our dotage. Can narratives play a part how individuals can ‘access’ their enduring 
self earlier in their lifespan. Thinking of the analogy of the planes on a sunny day, can this be 
compared to how a narrative may be used to ‘clear’ the ‘mist’ and ’fog’ of everyday 
socialisations such as described by Taylor and Brown (1998,p200) and allow the individual an 
uninterrupted view of their enduring self. 
 
I mentioned previously the empathic approaches to research and therapy, and one key area I see 
as common ground to both narratives and humanistic ideals is the concept that although the past 
and past experiences have their importance, the emphasis could be considered to focus on the 
present. Crites (1971, p241) sums this up most succinctly by observing that there is a ‘present of 
things past, a present of things present and a present of things future’. 
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